The Long Shadow of John Howard’s Economic Legacy

Australia’s former Prime Minister John Howard (in office 1996–2007) is often praised as a master economic manager. His government presided over a long stretch of prosperity, buoyed by a booming global economy and an unprecedented commodities windfall. But nearly two decades on, how much of Australia’s current economic and social landscape – the good and the bad – can be traced back to decisions made under Howard?

To answer this, we examine Howard’s economic legacy point by point: from the resources boom windfall and the GST, to housing policy, budget surpluses, and broader social changes. We’ll also compare his record with Labor governments and assess the claim that Howard was Australia’s “greatest economic manager”, all through evidence and expert analysis rather than political hyperbole.

Riding (and Missing) the Resources Boom

One of the defining features of Howard’s tenure was the early-2000s mining and resources boom, driven largely by surging Chinese demand for iron ore and coal.

Tax revenues flooded in from soaring company profits and mineral royalties – effectively a once-in-a-generation windfall. Economists note that instead of saving this bounty for long-term benefit or investing in diversifying Australia’s economy, the Howard Government channeled the windfall back out as tax cuts and new spending.

In other words, Canberra “recycled” the boom money into households’ pockets through personal income tax cuts and superannuation tax concessions.

This was popular at the time, but it also stimulated consumer spending and housing investment without addressing deeper economic needs. Richard Robinson of BIS Shrapnel remarked, “I’ve never seen something so squandered in my life,” referring to how the 2000s boom gains were handled.

The scale of the giveaway was enormous. A Treasury analysis found that between 2004 and 2007, an extra A$334 billion poured into federal coffers from the robust economy and mining boom, and Howard’s government spent or gave away 94% of it.

Likewise, the Business Council of Australia pointed out that in Howard’s last five years, about A$87 billion in surprise revenue was collected thanks to the boom – and all but A$2 billion was promptly spent on vote-winning tax cuts and handouts. Essentially, nothing was saved.

Howard’s treasurer, Peter Costello, did establish a Future Fund, but its mandate was narrow (to cover public service pension liabilities), and it wasn’t a vehicle for broader nation-building investment. No substantial deposits were made to it after Howard left office.

Critics argue this was a missed opportunity. Other resource-rich nations set up sovereign wealth funds or invested heavily in infrastructure, education and innovation during boom times. In Australia’s case, little of the mining boom dividend went into productivity-enhancing assets or economic diversification.

The Business Council observed that Howard-era budgets showed a “disconnect” with economic needs – capacity constraints went unaddressed even as consumer demand was turbocharged. Bottlenecks in infrastructure and skills training – vital for future growth – remained.

Mining billionaires and multinational companies reaped massive profits, but Australia did not significantly expand other industries or upskill its workforce for the post-boom world. By the time the commodities cycle turned, the country was over-reliant on mining and faced a downturn in tax revenues without a cushion.

In hindsight, economists like Professor Jakob Madsen suggest Australia “should have kept taxes up” during the boom and used the money to invest in areas like R&D, education, and agricultural innovation.

Instead, Australia entered the 2010s with little to show from the boom except higher asset prices and some public debt paid off. When commodity prices inevitably fell and the global financial crisis hit, the temporary surpluses vanished.

Australia’s budget quickly swung to deficit – exposing how structurally thin the tax base had become after years of tax cuts.

GST: A Bold Reform with Lasting Reverberations

Perhaps the signature economic reform of the Howard era was the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in July 2000. This 10% broad-based consumption tax was the culmination of decades of debate – Howard himself had once promised “never ever” to introduce a GST, only to reverse course and take it to the 1998 election (which he narrowly won).

In implementing the GST, Howard succeeded where previous attempts had failed, simplifying the tangled web of wholesale sales taxes and providing states with a new revenue source.

It was a politically courageous move, but it came with compromises: to get the GST through the Senate, fresh food was exempted, along with other essentials like health and education.

Several existing taxes (on alcohol, fuel and cigarettes and some state taxes) were cut or abolished at the same time , which punched a hole in revenue that the narrower-than-intended GST could not fully replace.

Over the long run, the GST has had mixed outcomes. On one hand, it did broaden the tax base and provided a more stable source of funding for state governments.

Today the GST raises about A$70 billion a year (roughly 13% of Australia’s total tax take) , which funds schools, hospitals, roads and more in the states.

On the other hand, that figure is far lower than anticipated. The compromises made in 2000 – exempting basic goods – combined with changes in consumer behavior have meant the GST has not kept pace with the economy.

As Australians spend proportionally more on untaxed items (like health, education and housing) and services, and less on GST-applicable goods, the tax’s base has shrunk in relative terms. In fact, the GST’s share of the economy has been in gradual decline since its inception.

This has significant implications today. Australia’s overall tax mix remains heavily dependent on income taxes and volatile corporate taxes, since the GST was not as large as originally envisaged. Debate continues about raising or broadening the GST to shore up revenues – a politically fraught proposition, but one that reflects the fact that Howard’s GST, while transformative in 2000, no longer raises what a modern economy of Australia’s size needs.

In short, Howard’s GST was a bold structural reform that proved both a milestone and a missed opportunity: a milestone because it modernised the tax system, and a missed opportunity because the final compromised design fell short of creating the “growth tax” that could sustainably underwrite public finances in the long run.

Two decades later, policymakers are still grappling with how to fix the GST’s shortcomings – a direct legacy of the choices made in its introduction.

Housing: Negative Gearing, Capital Gains and an Affordability Crisis

If there is one policy area where Howard’s legacy is keenly felt by ordinary Australians today, it’s housing affordability. Home prices boomed during his time in office and have kept soaring since, and many analysts point to tax policies instituted (or maintained) under Howard as a major cause.

The two most often cited are negative gearing and the capital gains tax (CGT) discount. Negative gearing (the ability to deduct investment property losses from your taxable income) has existed for decades, but it was Howard’s government that turbocharged its use.

In 1999, as part of a tax review, Howard and Costello halved the capital gains tax for assets held more than a year – switching from taxing only real (inflation-adjusted) gains to a flat 50% tax discount on nominal gains.

This seemingly arcane change made property speculation far more lucrative. As economist Greg Jericho explains, Howard effectively handed a “big tax-free gift to property investors”. For example, if an investor made an A$500,000 profit on a property sale, only half that amount would be taxed – the other quarter-million would be tax-free profit.

This CGT discount, when combined with negative gearing, created a powerful incentive: investors could buy houses, rent them out at a loss (claiming the loss against their salary income for a tax break each year), then later sell at a hefty profit and pay only half the tax on the gain.

In Jericho’s words, it allowed investors to “minimise tax both coming and going” . The results were dramatic. From 2000 onwards, the amount of money flowing into negatively geared property investments and the magnitude of capital gains in housing skyrocketed.

Australia’s housing market increasingly became a playground for leveraged investors, out-competing first-home buyers and driving prices to historic highs. Housing affordability worsened year after year – indeed, after 24 years of the CGT discount and negative gearing, nobody can seriously argue they improved affordability; clearly, they have not.

Beyond high prices, these tax policies have also exacerbated wealth inequality. The benefits are heavily skewed to the wealthy: the richest 10% of Australians capture about 82% of all the capital gains tax discount savings (worth about A$15.6 billion of lost revenue in 2023–24).

Negative gearing deductions are somewhat less concentrated but still disproportionately benefit high earners – the top 20% of income earners claim over half of all rental loss deductions.

To put it plainly, wealthy landlords have profited handsomely, while younger and lower-income Australians have struggled to compete in a housing market distorted by these tax breaks. Many experts, from the Reserve Bank to independent think-tanks, argue that Howard-era tax settings turned housing into an investor asset class and set the stage for the affordability crisis Australia faces today.

Every attempt to reform negative gearing or the CGT discount since has become a political flashpoint – another lasting ripple from decisions made in the Howard years.

Boom-Time Surpluses: Triumph or Illusion?

John Howard and Peter Costello famously delivered a string of budget surpluses and became the poster-children for fiscal prudence in Australian politics.

By the mid-2000s, the federal budget was tens of billions in the black each year, allowing Howard to claim credit as a responsible economic steward.

The government even paid off the entire net federal debt by 2006. On the surface, these surpluses were a remarkable turnaround from the deficits and debt of the early 1990s. But were they the result of brilliant economic management, or simply good luck?

A closer look suggests the surpluses had more to do with the rivers of gold flowing from the mining boom than with extraordinary frugality. Even at the time, analysts pointed out that company tax receipts were overflowing thanks to the commodities boom and global growth – what Labor’s finance spokesman Lindsay Tanner described in 2007 as “the mining boom… raining money on the Howard Government”.

Indeed, those bulging surpluses were largely windfall gains. Rather than exercising restraint, Howard’s team used the surplus money liberally to fund tax cuts and new spending in each pre-election budget (often referred to as “middle-class welfare”).

As discussed, nearly all of the boom revenue was spent . So in effect, the budgets would have been close to balance or in deficit without the boom. Costello himself acknowledged that about A$1 in every A$5 in the 2006–07 federal revenue came directly from the mining sector’s boom profits – an extraordinary dependence on one volatile sector.

Another oft-forgotten aspect is that Howard’s surpluses were boosted by major one-off asset sales. The government sold off a slew of public assets – airports, rail, the remaining Commonwealth Bank shares, and, most controversially, Telstra (the national telecommunications company).

These privatizations brought in tens of billions and helped retire debt, but at the cost of foregone future income (no more government dividends from those assets) and, in Telstra’s case, contributing to Australia’s later broadband woes. As one economic analysis put it, selling off “the farm” padded the balance sheet in the short run but left a legacy of lost public wealth.

Had Australia retained some of those income-generating assets, our current angst over government debt might be much less.

Were the surpluses put to good use? Some was used for future liabilities (Future Fund) and specific projects, but much went to election-driven tax cuts and cash bonuses.

Economists argue the Howard Government failed to invest adequately in infrastructure and skills despite the ample funds available.

For example, spending on education and training grew only modestly, and Australia entered the late 2000s with persistent capacity constraints – think congested transport, under-resourced TAFEs, and an undersupply of tradespeople – which helped stoke inflation. By 2008, incoming Treasurer Wayne Swan lambasted the “inflation legacy” of Howard’s spending, implying the government had added to demand without easing supply bottlenecks.

The Business Council in 2008 noted that the big tax cuts had boosted consumption but not productivity, calling for a re-focus on “supply side” investments (in infrastructure, workforce participation, etc.) which had been neglected .

In fairness, running surpluses and reducing public debt did give Australia more fiscal firepower to respond to the later Global Financial Crisis. Howard also built a political consensus that budgets should be balanced across the economic cycle, a norm that endures.

But the rosy glow of those surplus years has faded as we now see the flip side: a structural deficit left behind. Once the commodity boom ended and the tax cuts remained, the federal budget found itself in deep deficit through the 2010s. In other words, Howard and Costello cut the tax base to a point that was unsustainable once boom times passed.

That is not the hallmark of long-term fiscal management. The surpluses were real, but they were built on temporarily high revenues and asset sales – a tide that inevitably went out. As one columnist later quipped, “the mining boom is what made Howard a genius – until it was over.”

Social and Policy Legacies Beyond the Economy

Howard’s impact extended well beyond the balance sheets. His era ushered in social and political policies that continue to shape Australia’s identity and challenges. Any balanced analysis should acknowledge both positive legacies and contentious ones:

• Gun Control: One unequivocal achievement was Howard’s swift action on gun control after the 1996 Port Arthur massacre. He forged a national agreement to ban automatic and semi-automatic weapons and implemented a huge gun buyback. This policy took around 650,000 firearms out of circulation (they were bought and melted down) , and studies found it dramatically reduced gun deaths – firearm suicide rates fell by an estimated 74% in the decade after . Australia has had zero mass shootings in the decades since. This stands as a lasting, life-saving legacy of the Howard years, often held up internationally as a model.

• Immigration and Asylum Seekers: Howard also fundamentally changed Australia’s approach to asylum seekers arriving by boat. In 2001, faced with the Tampa affair, his government introduced the “Pacific Solution” – offshore processing and detention of asylum seekers on remote islands, and turning back boats at sea. This hardline policy (summed up by Howard’s phrase “We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come”) proved popular with many voters and has been largely maintained by every government since, entrenching an era of deterrence-based asylum policy. The ethical and human costs – prolonged detention and international criticism – are a lasting controversy that stems from this era.

• Indigenous Affairs: The Howard government’s relationship with Indigenous Australians was marked by mixed signals. Howard oversaw significant practical measures – for instance, the 1998 Native Title Amendment Act (though contentious) and in 2007 the Northern Territory Emergency Response (the federal intervention in remote Aboriginal communities over child welfare concerns). Yet Howard pointedly refused to offer a national apology to the Stolen Generations of Indigenous people, arguing current generations shouldn’t take responsibility for past wrongs. This stance left a bitterness that only began to heal when his successor, Kevin Rudd, delivered the Apology in 2008. Howard’s era thus left a complex legacy on Indigenous matters: greater federal involvement in Indigenous communities’ issues, but also a perceived setback in reconciliation and recognition.

• Industrial Relations: In his final term, Howard introduced “WorkChoices” (2005–06), a sweeping deregulation of labour laws aimed at increasing workplace flexibility. It sharply curtailed labor union power and removed many employee protections. Businesses were enthused, but workers feared erosion of pay and conditions. The backlash was so strong it became a key factor in Howard’s 2007 election loss. Although Labor repealed WorkChoices, the broader push for a more individualised, deregulated labour market lived on. Through the Howard years, union membership declined and the balance of power tilted toward employers – trends that have partly persisted. Yet, tellingly, the promised economic benefits of such IR “reform” never clearly materialized: despite employers gaining most of what they wanted (lower wage growth, more flexibility, less union action), productivity growth in Australia actually slowed in the long run . This suggests that simply weakening worker protections – the hallmark of WorkChoices – was not a magic bullet for economic performance.

• Middle-Class Welfare and Social Policy: Howard’s government actively used the budget to shape social behavior and win over key voter groups (the so-called “Howard’s battlers”). They introduced or expanded payments like the Baby Bonus (a cash payment for new mothers), Family Tax Benefits, and a 30% private health insurance rebate (to encourage Australians into private health cover). These measures had lasting effects: today, the structure of family benefits and health funding still bears Howard’s imprint. Critics say some of these were economically inefficient or regressive (e.g. the health rebate channeling public funds to subsidise private insurance), but they undeniably changed expectations around government support for middle-income families. Another social change was Howard’s emphasis on traditional values – for instance, in 2004 he amended the Marriage Act to explicitly ban same-sex marriage (a ban that lasted until 2017). Culturally, Howard championed a particular vision of Australia that was more conservative on issues of nationhood and values (he was a staunch monarchist who helped defeat the republic referendum in 1999). These political choices have had enduring cultural ripples.

It’s clear that the Howard era set in motion policies and attitudes that Australia still grapples with. Some were for the better (gun safety, a strong stance against extremism, national unity after 9/11), and some arguably for the worse (a harsher refugee regime, stalled reconciliation, and industrial tension).

In all cases, the continuity of these policies through subsequent governments underlines how Howard’s influence did not end in 2007 – it cast a long shadow over Australia’s social and political trajectory.

The Long-Term Record: Howard vs. Labor Governments

No assessment of Howard’s legacy is complete without comparing it to the record of Labor governments that preceded and followed him. Howard often claimed superior economic credentials over his Labor rivals – and indeed this became a core Liberal Party narrative.

Yet the data over the long term tells a more nuanced story, one where Labor governments have also managed strong economies and often addressed neglected areas of equity and investment.

Economic Growth and Resilience: Howard’s time coincided with the continuation of Australia’s longest economic expansion, which in fact began under the Hawke/Keating Labor governments in the early 1990s after they enacted sweeping reforms (floating the dollar, financial deregulation, tariff reductions, enterprise bargaining, etc.) . Those reforms laid the foundation for the prosperity of the 1990s and 2000s – a point Paul Keating often reminds us of. By the late 1990s, Australia’s economy was one of the top performers globally. However, under Howard Australia’s relative ranking slipped as the years went by: Australia was among the top 6 OECD economies in various metrics in the mid-90s, but had fallen to around 10th by 2007 . Other countries caught up or surpassed us in growth and innovation during that period . In contrast, during Labor’s subsequent tenure (2007–2013 under Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard), Australia famously avoided recession during the Global Financial Crisis – the only developed economy to do so. In 2009, Australia had the fastest GDP growth in the OECD thanks to decisive fiscal stimulus and robust Chinese demand. This outperformance was not just luck; the Rudd government’s quick deployment of stimulus spending (cash handouts, school building projects, infrastructure and housing investments) was credited by the IMF and others with keeping Australia out of a deep downturn.

Fiscal Management: There’s a persistent myth that Labor are “big spenders” and Liberals are prudent. In reality, both sides have had to spend big at times. Notably, Labor’s stimulus spending in the GFC (2008–09) did push the deficit up, but it was a deliberate counter-cyclical policy that arguably saved the economy. By the early 2010s, Labor started tightening budgets again (Swan aimed for surplus by 2012, though falling revenue thwarted it). When we look at overall fiscal outcomes, the pattern is interesting: historically, Coalition governments have often benefited from good economic times and then Labor governments inherit downturns (1983, 2007, 2022) and have to do repair work. For instance, Howard inherited rising growth and declining unemployment in 1996, whereas Rudd inherited an overheating economy on the cusp of the GFC in 2007. Despite this, Labor governments have shown they can manage debt and deficits responsibly over the cycle – Australia’s public debt remained among the lowest in the developed world through the Rudd/Gillard years and beyond. In fact, by 2013 Australia’s net debt was trivial relative to GDP, and our AAA credit rating was maintained.

OECD Rankings and Global Standing: Under Labor leadership, Australia at times reached heights in global rankings. As mentioned, after the GFC, Australia’s growth, employment, and banking stability were the envy of other nations. Conversely, during the later Howard and subsequent Abbott/Turnbull/Morrison Coalition years, Australia’s ranking slipped on some economic indicators. By 2015, a couple of years into another Coalition government, we had fallen to 12th in GDP growth among OECD countries (down from 1st in 2009 under Labor) . By 2020 we were 20th, and by 2022 down to 31st (albeit the pandemic played a role) . While one can’t pin all these shifts on a single government, it challenges the notion that conservatives are always better economic managers. It suggests that external conditions and prior reforms matter more – and that Labor governments’ interventions (like the 2000s stimulus) have at times improved Australia’s relative economic performance.

Social Equity: One stark difference between Howard’s era and Labor’s approach lies in income distribution and social safety nets. During Howard’s prime ministership, income inequality in Australia steadily worsened . The top end benefited from tax cuts and asset booms, while minimum wages and welfare benefits saw only modest rises. The share of wealth held by the richest grew, and by 2007 Australia’s Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality) was higher than it had been in the 1980s. In contrast, Labor governments historically placed more emphasis on equity: for example, the Rudd/Gillard government raised the aged pension significantly (the largest ever increase in 2009), boosting incomes for the poorest retirees. They also introduced reforms like Paid Parental Leave and the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) – major investments in social infrastructure intended to spread opportunity and support to the vulnerable. These initiatives, while costly, were aimed at long-term fairness and productivity (a healthier, more inclusive society ultimately contributes to economic strength).

It’s also worth noting that Labor tended to invest more in public goods like education, healthcare, and infrastructure. The Gillard Government’s “Gonski” school funding reforms sought to direct more resources to disadvantaged schools (though full implementation was stalled by later governments).

They also rolled out the ambitious National Broadband Network (NBN), a public infrastructure project to modernize communications, born partly out of frustration with the underinvestment by privatised Telstra.

The NBN, while criticized for cost overruns, was a forward-looking investment that Howard’s market-oriented approach had eschewed. In summary, Labor’s long-term record shows a willingness to invest in the future and in social equity, sometimes at the expense of short-term budget bottom lines.

The Coalition under Howard, by contrast, often prioritized immediate returns to voters (tax cuts, cash payments) and laissez-faire market policies, which delivered short-term growth but left some social deficits that later needed addressing.

Greatest Economic Manager Ever?

Howard’s supporters often laud him as “Australia’s greatest economic manager”. It’s a grand claim – one that even Howard, a famously confident politician, has been happy to encourage. But does it hold up under scrutiny? The evidence suggests a more measured verdict.

On the plus side, Howard’s government presided over low unemployment, stable inflation, and 11 years without a recession – outcomes any leader would boast about. He championed a culture of fiscal discipline (no government in recent memory dares to campaign without promising a return to surplus, a Howard-era political norm). He also took on hard reforms like the GST that predecessors dodged, showing political courage in pursuit of economic restructuring. These are significant credits to his name.

However, labeling Howard the greatest economic manager overlooks the substantial role of good fortune and groundwork laid by others. The late 1990s and early 2000s were a golden economic period globally – a rising tide that lifted Australia.

Howard was fortunate to govern during a time of steady world growth, a tech boom (which filled government coffers via capital gains taxes on a roaring stock market), and of course the China-fueled commodities super-cycle. By contrast, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating managed through far more turbulent waters (a deep recession, deregulating a sheltered economy) and Kevin Rudd faced the worst global crisis since the 1930s.

It’s easier to look like a “great economic manager” when the seas are calm and the wind is at your back.

Moreover, many of Howard’s successes were built on reforms initiated by the Hawke/Keating Labor governments. The productivity surge of the 1990s that carried into Howard’s first term was largely due to Keating-era policy changes.

Even the ability to implement the GST was helped by Australia’s strong institutions and relatively flexible economy – again, fruits of earlier reform. In independent assessments, when economists compare performance across governments, the results don’t crown Howard unequivocally.

For instance, one study found Labor governments tended to have lower inflation and interest rates, while Coalition governments (like Howard’s) had slightly lower unemployment – in other words, a mixed scorecard . And as mentioned, Australia’s GDP per capita ranking among developed nations didn’t improve under Howard – if anything, it slipped by the end .

Perhaps the strongest argument against Howard’s “greatest ever” title is the long-term consequences of some of his choices. Today’s housing affordability nightmare, widening wealth gap, and eroded tax base can all be traced in part to Howard-era policies that traded long-term prudence for short-term gains.

A truly great economic manager would have prepared Australia for future challenges when he had the chance – by reforming the tax mix further (for example, addressing generous negative gearing), by investing the mining windfall in nation-building assets or a sovereign fund, or by securing new drivers of growth beyond mining. Howard did pay down government debt, which was prudent, but meanwhile private household debt exploded as Australians leveraged up on real estate.

He largely ignored climate change and the need to shift to a low-carbon economy, despite warnings even then – a choice that leaves Australia economically vulnerable as the world inevitably pivots to clean energy. He froze compulsory superannuation contributions at 9% (scrapping Keating’s plan to raise them to 15% ), which meant Australians saved less for retirement than they could have – a burden future governments are now trying to fix.

In sum, Howard was a shrewd political manager of the economy – he knew how to time policies to win voter approval and surf the waves of prosperity. But the title of greatest economic manager implies not only riding the good times but also wisely preparing for the bad. And on that score, the Howard legacy looks more mixed. Australia’s current challenges – from the housing crisis to budget pressures – are in no small part products of decisions deferred or directions set during the Howard years. That doesn’t erase his achievements, but it places them in context.

Conclusion: A Legacy with Light and Shadow

Mackenzie McHale might put it this way: John Howard’s legacy is neither outright triumph nor unmitigated disaster, but a complex mosaic of prudent steps and missed chances. He left Australia richer in the short term, yet arguably weaker in some of the foundations that only become visible in the long term. His tenure benefited millions – unemployment fell, home ownership rose for many (at least for those who got in before prices escalated), and the nation enjoyed a sense of stability and security. But beneath the surface, certain inequalities widened and structural cracks formed, the consequences of which are strikingly evident today.

Comparing eras reminds us that no government has a monopoly on good economic management. Labor and Coalition governments alike have faced different tests and had different priorities. Howard capitalized on a boom and cemented a small-government, low-tax philosophy in Australian politics. Labor, in its turns, often had to clean up or rebalance when that philosophy showed its limits (whether through stimulus spending or social reforms).

Australia’s future challenges – making housing affordable, expanding the tax base (perhaps by reconsidering sacred cows like the GST or negative gearing), investing in productivity beyond mining, and ensuring growth is inclusive and sustainable – can be traced back through the decisions of yesterday’s leaders.

John Howard’s government, ruling at a time of great fortune, made choices that solved some problems but kicked others down the road. In the final analysis, Howard’s long-term impact on Australia is a story of short-term prosperity versus long-term preparation. The record shows plenty of the former and, unfortunately, not quite enough of the latter.

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Sources:

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2. https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/we-really-must-talk-about-the-howard-and-costello-economic-disaster,5686

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